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The internet has no shortage of photographs and videos showing armed
men in Crimea who look like members of the Russian military. Their
guns are the same as those used by the Russian army, their lorries have
Russian number plates and they speak in Russian accents. Yet according to President Vladimir Putin, they are in fact members of “selfdefence groups” organised by the locals who bought all their uniforms
and hardware in a shop. This poses a challenge to the media covering
the crisis: what do you call people who are officially not there?1

I. INTRODUCTION

O

n March 1, 2014 a combination of Russian regular armed forces and
unidentified operatives occupied the recognized territory of Ukraine on the
Crimean peninsula.2 Approximately two weeks later Russian forces mobilized along Ukraine’s eastern border in support of separatist forces engaging in hostilities with the Ukrainian government.3 President Vladimir Putin,
in eventually acknowledging the Russian occupation of Crimea, argued for
1. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian Invaders”?, BBC (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.
2. Tim Sullivan & Vladimir Isachenkov, Russian Troops Take Over Ukraine’s Crimea
Region, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/russian-troops-over-ukra
ines-crimea-region-200052097.html (“Russian troops took over the strategic Crimean
peninsula . . . without firing a shot.”).
3. Steven Lee Meyers & Alison Smale, Russian Troops Mass at Border With Ukraine,
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/eur
ope/ukraine.html?_r=1 (“[T]he buildup on Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia signaled
possible further moves by the Kremlin to reassert authority by force over territory, also
heavily populated by Russians, forfeited in the Soviet Union breakup two decades ago.”).
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the legitimacy of the territorial violation by claiming a moral imperative to
act on behalf of Russian-speaking minorities on the peninsula.4 In contrast,
while admittedly in agreement with the pro-Russian secession movement,
the Russian Federation denied intervening in the civil war occurring in
eastern Ukraine.5 As an occupation and a civil war are simultaneously taking place in Ukraine6 a particularly vexing international law question is presented: what is the legal status of those involved in the hostilities?
This article is designed to answer that question and to identify the associated rights, duties and responsibilities of the participants in the conflict.7
As classifying a conflict is a condition precedent for determining an individual’s status in that conflict, it is important to first define the Ukrainian
hostilities. Despite clear Russian involvement, this is not a simple task.
While the Crimea occupation is clearly international in character,8 the con4. See, e.g., Transcript: Putin Defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASHINGTON POST,
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defends-russianintervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html
(President Putin explaining that the intervention in Ukraine is based upon a request for aid
by the deposed legitimate government, as well as for various humanitarian purposes,
including protecting citizens from anti-Semitic violence). But see Harriet Torry & Bertrand
Benoit, Watchdog Sees No Threat to Ethnic Russians, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 12, 2014,
at A10 (noting that the Council of Europe, an organization that eschews political
judgment, made clear that there was no legal justification for Russia’s intervention into
Crimea, and quoting Thorbjorn Jagland, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, as
saying “we don’t actually see any signs of real threat to the minorities or the Russian
majorities [in Ukraine].”).
5. Thousands of Russian Soldiers Sent to Ukraine, Say Rights Groups, THE GUARDIAN (Sept.
1, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/russian-soldiers-ukraine-righ
ts-groups (quoting Sergei Nikitin, Director for Amnesty International in Russia, “The
Kremlin is determined to muzzle its critics and keep a strong lid on any information which
suggests that Russia plays a direct part in the conflict in Ukraine, although evidence to the
contrary is mounting every day.”).
6. See John Vandiver, SACEUR: Allies Must Prepare for Russia Hybrid War, STARS &
STRIPES (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/05/saceur-alliesmust-prepare-for-russia-hybrid-war.html (discussing the combination of tactics used by
Russia in Ukraine).
7. See Sean Watts, The Notion of Combatancy in Cyber Warfare, in 4TH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 235, 239 (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Katherine
Ziolkowski eds., 2012), available at https://ccdcoe.org/cycon/2012/proceedings/d2r1s10
_watts.pdf. Professor Watt’s conference paper updates concepts and ideas developed
previously in great depth in Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (2009).
8. An international armed conflict exists in “all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
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flict in eastern Ukraine is more akin to a civil war.9 The combination of
State and non-State actors battling in the same geographic area10 makes status determinations for those participating extraordinarily difficult.11 Conducting this analysis requires viewing the Ukrainian hostilities as an international and non-international armed conflict existing in parallel. Through
this conflict classification paradigm individual status determinations are
possible and, subsequently, concomitant legal responsibilities and protections associated with those determinations are clarified.

even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them” and in “cases of partial or total
occupation.” Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]. The 1977 Additional
Protocol I, which supplements the Geneva Conventions, also applies “in the situation
referred to in Article 2,” as well as in those “armed conflicts which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflict art. 1(3)–(4), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP I].
9. “Armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties” is defined as a non-international armed conflict. See GC
III, supra note 8, art. 3. Additional Protocol II supplements “Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions,” but limits the applicability of the law to only those situations where
“dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” which are “under responsible
command” exercise “control over a part” of a State. See Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflict art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. It
is important to note that the United States has not ratified AP I or AP II, but finds many
portions of the protocols to be customary international law. See generally Michael J.
Matheson, Remarks on the United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419 (1987).
10. With an amalgamation of international and non-international characteristics, the
entirety of the Ukraine conflict is perhaps best described as a “hybrid war.” A hybrid war
can refer to those conflicts that are a combination of unconventional and conventional
tactics. See, e.g., Shane Reeves & Rob Barnsby, The New Griffin of International Law: Hybrid
Armed Conflicts, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Winter 2013, at 16, 17. Or it can
refer to those that are both international and non-international in character. See, e.g., Steven
Haines, The Nature of War and the Character of Contemporary Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 9, 23 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst
ed., 2012).
11. See generally Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (highlighting the difficulty of
prosecuting individuals when an internal and international armed conflict are taking place
simultaneously).
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Identifying the actors on the Ukrainian battlefields and outlining their
legal responsibilities and obligations is not simply an academic exercise. It
is a practical necessity for ensuring that both conflict participants and other
persons not engaged in the hostilities are treated in accordance with the
well-established humanitarian principles embedded within the law of armed
conflict. Further, crystallizing the battlefield status of the actors eliminates
any later claims of ignorance, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood
of accountability. The importance of determining the status of the actors in
Ukraine is one particularly effective method of ensuring that the conflict
does not further devolve into unchecked “brutality and savagery.”12
As it is important to understand a chronology of the Ukraine conflict,
the article begins with a brief background section. Sections on conflict classification and international law as it relates to battlefield status determinations will follow as both are germane to understanding the status of the
Ukrainian participants. It concludes with a status determination for each
participant in the hostilities and a reminder that all parties to the conflict
are obligated to comply with the law of armed conflict.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE UKRAINE HOSTILITIES
On February 7, 2014 the XXII Olympic Winter Games’ opening ceremony
took place at the Fisht Olympic Stadium in Sochi, Russia.13 Costing billions
of dollars,14 the games were widely seen as an opportunity for President
Putin to “show off Russia as a resurgent superpower.”15 However, the celebration was quickly upset on February 23 with the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian President of Ukraine. Political unrest in Ukraine
12. Rob McLauglin, The Law of Armed Conflict and International Human Rights Law: Some
Paradigmatic Differences and Operational Implications, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 213, 222 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2010) (citing UNITED KINGDOM
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 1.8 (2004)).
13. Sochi 2014 Opening Ceremony: Russia Welcomes the World, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www
.olympic.org/sochi-2014/opening-ceremony (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
14. How much the Sochi Olympics cost is debatable. Some sources have reported the
cost at upwards of fifty billion dollars while others dispute this claim. See, e.g., Paul Farhi,
Did the Winter Olympics in Sochi Really Cost $50 billion? A Closer Look at that Figure,
WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/did
-the-winter-olympics-in-sochi-really-cost-50-billion-a-closer-look-at-that-figure/2014/02/
10/a29e37b4-9260-11e3-b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html.
15. Rick Broadbent & Ben Hoyle, Olympic Ring Fails to Light, but the Rest is a Red-hot
Spectacle, TIMES (London) (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/sport/olympics
/article3999518.ece.
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had been simmering since November 2013 when Ukraine rejected a partnership accord with the European Union (EU) in favor of closer ties with
Russia.16 As protests continued throughout the winter the Yanukovych
government became increasingly heavy handed, culminating in government
snipers killing and wounding hundreds of protestors in Kiev on February
19.17 The harsh tactics galvanized the anti-government protestors leading
thousands to fill Kiev’s Independence Square to demand Yanukovych’s
removal.18 On February 22, in an emergency session, the Ukrainian parliament voted 380–0 to remove Yanukovych from office, accused him of being “guilty of gross human rights violations and dereliction of duty” and set
new presidential elections for May 25.19
While the deposed Yanukovych fled to his Russian-speaking political
base in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine,20 the response from many
to the political turmoil was overwhelmingly positive. The United States applauded the “constructive work” of the Ukrainian parliament and urged
“the prompt formation of a broad, technocratic government of national
unity.”21 The EU, viewing the Ukraine events as a humiliating geopolitical
setback to Putin,22 openly supported the interim government and called on
the Russian government to recognize the territorial integrity of Ukraine.23
16. See James Marson, Alan Cullison & Alexander Kolyandr, Ukraine President Viktor
Yanukovych Driven from Power, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304914204579398561953855036.
17. See id.
18. See William Booth, Ukraine’s Parliament Votes to Oust President; Former Prime Minster is
Freed from Prison, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/europe/ukraines-yanukovych-missing-as-protesters-take-control-of-presidenti
al-residence-in-kiev/2014/02/22/802f7c6c-9bd2-11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0_story.html.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press
Secretary on Ukraine (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20
14/02/22/statement-press-secretary-ukraine.
22. See Will Englund, Putin Takes Losses on Ukraine, but Russia Still has Leverage and the
Will to Use it, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wo
rld/putin-takes-losses-on-ukraine-but-russia-still-has-leverage-and-the-will-to-use-it/2014/
02/23/80d832ba-9cbf-11e3-ad71-e03637a299c0_story.html (discussing the importance of
Ukraine to Putin’s goal of creating the Eurasian Customs Union, an envisioned economic
counterbalance to the EU and the United States).
23. See Stefan Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy, Remarks during European Parliament Plenary Debate on Ukraine
at Strasbourg, France: EU response to events in Ukraine (Feb. 26, 2014), http://eu
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-162_en.htm (“[I]t puts a greater re-sponsibility
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Western prognosticators, though quietly recognizing the historic and contemporary importance of Ukraine to Russia, saw any military response to
the Yanukovych removal as implausible.24 These predictions were quickly
proven wrong when on February 27 armed men seized the Crimean parliament25 and raised the Russian flag.26
Simultaneous with the parliamentary take-over, “heavily armed Russian-speaking troops poured into Crimea, seizing airports and other key
installations throughout the peninsula.”27 Carrying Russian weapons and
wearing Russian uniforms, but with no identifying insignia, these seemingly
professional soldiers were dubbed “little green men” by the local Ukrainians.28 While the occupiers quickly swept through the peninsula, Putin denied Russian involvement, claiming the armed men to be local Crimean
self-defense forces.29 Despite these denials, on March 1 Putin received authorization from the Russian Federation’s upper house of parliament for
use of regular troops already stationed in Crimea to “seize control of the
peninsula and its mechanisms of government.”30 In response, the interim
President of Ukraine, Oleksandr Turchynov, stated, “[w]e consider the beon the new Ukrainian government—interim and beyond—to deliver the changes the
people have asked and fought for. It puts also a greater responsibility on the European
Union to extend all our support and expertise to ensure that these changes are put on
solid ground and will be sustainable.”).
24. See, e.g., Simon Shuster, No, Russia Will Not Intervene in Ukraine, TIME (Feb. 25,
2014), http://time.com/9826/russia-ukraine-putin-intervene/.
25. Crimea has immense strategic importance to Russia as the home of its Black Sea
Fleet, as well as a large contingent of ethnic Russians. See Paul N. Schwartz, Crimea’s
Strategic Value to Russia, CSIS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://csis.org/blog/crimeas-strategicvalue-russia.
26. See Gabriela Baczynska, Pavel Polityuk & Raissa Kasolowsky, Timeline: Political
Crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s Occupation of Crimea, REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2014), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-ukraine-crisis-timeline-idUSBREA270PO20140
308.
27. STEVEN WOEHREL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL33460, UKRAINE:
CURRENT ISSUES AND U.S. POLICY 2 (Sept. 4, 2014) (“Russia responded to the change of
government in Kyiv by seizing Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.”).
28. See Steven Pifer, Opinion, Watch Out for Little Green Men, BROOKINGS (July 7,
2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/07/07-watch-out-little-greenmen-pifer.
29. See WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.
30. See Kathy Lally, Will Englund & William Booth, Russian Parliament Approves Use of
Troops in Ukraine, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/europe/russian-parliament-approves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/d1775f
70-a151-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html.
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havior of the Russian Federation to be direct aggression against the sovereignty of Ukraine.”31 The U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry echoed this
sentiment calling the actions an “incredible act of aggression” and a violation of international law.32
Ignoring these complaints, and rebuffing efforts to solve the crisis, 33
Russia moved to further its control of the peninsula by setting a March 16
referendum for the people of Crimea to vote on whether the Russian Federation should annex the territory.34 Although dismissed by the United
States and most of Europe as illegal, 95.5 percent of those voting supported the idea of joining the Russian Federation.35 On March 18, after receiving a standing ovation from the Russian parliament, President Putin agreed
to sign a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation, stating that the
peninsula has always been a “part of Russia.”36 In denouncing Russia’s actions, U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden called the annexation “nothing more
than a land grab,” while United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron
stated that “it is completely unacceptable for Russia to use force to change
borders on the basis of a sham referendum held at the barrel of a Russian
gun.”37 The Ukrainian government, stating that they would never recognize
the illegal annexation, declared that the crisis had “moved from the political
to the military stage.”38

31. Id.
32. Will Dunham, Kerry Condemns Russia’s “Incredible Act of Aggression” in Ukraine,
REUTERS, (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisisusa-kerry-idUSBREA210DG20140302 (stating “[i]t’s an incredible act of aggression. It is
really a stunning, willful choice by President (Vladimir) Putin to invade another country.
Russia is in violation of the sovereignty of Ukraine. Russia is in violation of its
international obligations.”).
33. See Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, supra note 26 (noting that warning shots
were “fired to prevent an unarmed observer mission sent by the OSCE from entering
Crimea” and that Russian forces had become “increasingly aggressive towards Ukrainian
troops trapped in bases”).
34. Id.
35. See Crimea Referendum: Voters “Back Russia Union,” BBC (Mar. 16, 2014), http://w
ww.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097 (stating that many loyal to Kiev boycotted
the voting).
36. See Ukraine Crisis: Putin Signs Russia-Crimea Treaty, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), http://w
ww.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26630062 (“President Putin told parliament that figures
from the Crimea vote were ‘more than convincing.’”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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The occupation of Crimea became just one front in a broader conflict
when on March 12 Russian troops were spotted massing along Ukraine’s
eastern border.39 While eastern Ukraine, particularly in the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, was the epicenter of pro-Russian protests following the
removal of Yanukovych from office,40 conventional Russian military action
during February and March was confined to Crimea.41 However, Russia
began to shift military attention towards eastern Ukraine as an increasingly
aggressive group of demonstrators demanded greater union with the Russian Federation.42 As thousands of Russian soldiers sat at the border, the
unrest in eastern Ukraine took an ominous turn on April 6 when protestors
and armed men stormed and occupied key government buildings and
broadcast facilities in Donetsk, Luhansk, Slovyansk and more than a dozen
other towns.43 As these groups hoisted Russian flags, the Ukrainian government, the United States and many European nations accused Russia of
orchestrating the seizure of the buildings and stoking the agitation.44 On
April 17 Putin, while admitting that the “little green men” who participated
in the early stages of the Crimea crisis were actually Russian soldiers, denied using similar tactics or personnel in eastern Ukraine stating “that all of
this is being done by local residents.”45
Throughout late spring and early summer the intensity and sophistication of the violence in eastern Ukraine exponentially increased. This was
highlighted on July 17 when the separatists, using an advanced surface-toair missile, shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17 killing all 298 peo-

39. See Steven Lee Myers & Alison Smale, Russian Troops Mass at Border With Ukraine,
NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/eur
ope/ukraine.html?_r=1.
40. See WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.
41. See Myers & Smale, supra note 39.
42. See WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.
43. Id.
44. See Kathy Lally, Putin’s Remarks Raise Fears of Future Moves Against Ukraine,
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-ch
anges-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c
617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html.
45. See id. But see Bojan Pancevski, Putin’s 300 Whip Up Ukrainian Turmoil, THE
SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world
_news/Ukraine/article1404493.ece (“Russia has been accused of carrying out an ‘invasion
from within’ of Ukraine using 300 elite special operatives, many of them from its feared
GRU military intelligence service.”).
369

Combatant Status of the Participants in the Ukraine Conflict

Vol. 91

ple on board.46 The separatists’ access to self-propelled artillery, tanks and
other heavy weaponry,47 coupled with numerous reports of Russian soldiers moving within Ukraine,48 led NATO Supreme Commander General
Philip Breedlove to state he “believed Russia is playing a leading role in the
activities of the armed separatist groups in eastern Ukraine.”49 The U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey R. Pyatt, went further in a tweet on August 28, saying that Russian forces were fighting in eastern Ukraine in support of the separatists.50 Russia, in responding to the accusations, denied
participating in the conflict, but did not refute separatist claims “that up to
4,000 Russians, including active-duty soldiers currently on leave, had been
fighting against Ukrainian government forces.”51
On September 5 the Ukrainian government and the separatists agreed
to a ceasefire plan that was to be monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).52 However, the ceasefire was im-

46. See Margaret Coker, Lukas I. Alpert & Robin Van Daalen, Investigators Reach Site of
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Crash: Ukraine Declared One-Day Pause in Fighting Around MH17
Area, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 31, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrainedeclares-one-day-pause-in-fighting-around-mh17-crash-site-1406799743.
47. See William Mauldin, U.S. Imposes Sanctions, Renews Concerns Over Russian Forces Near
Ukraine, WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 20, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-addsukrainian-separatists-to-sanctions-list-1403277646 (noting that Ukraine accused the
Russians of supplying separatists with tanks and other advanced weaponry).
48. See Neil MacFarquhar & Michael R. Gordon, Ukraine Leader Says “Huge Loads of
Arms” Pour in From Russia, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/08/29/world/europe/ukraine-conflict.html.
49. WOEHREL, supra note 27, at 2.
50. See MacFarquhar & Gordon, supra note 48.
51. Id. (“That assertion evaded the issue of direct Russian involvement by painting the
soldiers as volunteers. It suggests, however, that Moscow still seeks to organize and to
some extent control a force that could be operated at arm’s length with a backbone of
local participation.”). See also Alexander Warkentin, Disowned and Forgotten: Russian Soldiers in
Ukraine, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.dw.de/disowned-and-forgottenrussian-soldiers-in-ukraine/a-17888902 (quoting Lev Schlosberg, representative of the
deputy assembly for the Pskov district in northwest Russia, as saying “[t]he community
must know what’s really happening. . . . [T]he civil authorities as well as the defense
ministry are not telling the truth. . . . There is enough evidence that regular Russian
troops—disguised as units of self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk—are
taking part in the fighting in Ukraine.”).
52. See Ukraine, Pro-Russia Separatist Rebels Sign Ceasefire, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 5,
2014), http://www.dw.de/ukraine-pro-russia-separatist-rebels-sign-ceasefire/a-17904239.
The plan, among other things, allowed for a prisoner exchange and amnesty for those who
voluntarily disarmed and had not committed serious crimes. See Neil MacFarquhar,
370

International Law Studies

2015

mediately ignored as the separatists refused to disarm or abandon disputed
areas to the Ukrainian government.53 Fierce fighting around the Donetsk
airport on September 12 starkly illustrated the ineffectiveness of the ceasefire,54 and by November 20 casualties from combat operations approached
one thousand since the signing of the agreement.55 All pretenses of a truce
had disappeared by January 22, 2015 when “an artillery shell hit a bus stopping for passengers in . . . Donetsk” killing multiple civilians,56 and continuous combat between Ukrainian forces and the separatists became the
norm.57 The significant increase in violence prompted a second ceasefire to
go into effect on February 15.58 While Russia and Western powers continue
to argue over responsibility for the conflict, the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights reports that since the beginning of the
violence over five thousand people have been killed, approximately eleven
thousand wounded and hundreds of thousands displaced.59

Ukraine Deal Imposes Truce Putin Devised, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/europe/ukraine-cease-fire.html?_r=0.
53. See Volodymyr Verbyany & Ilya Arkhipov, Ukraine Truce Wobbles as Poroshenko
Visits Frontline City, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-09-06/ukraine-sees-cease-fire-holding-as-russian-troops-poised.
54. See Ledyard King, Ukraine Fends Off Rebel Attack Near Donetsk Airport, USA TODAY
(Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/09/13/ukrainestate-of-war/15574715/. The fighting prompted Ukraine Prime Minister Arseniy
Yatsenyuk’s to state, “[t]his government is the wartime government. And let me put it
bluntly—we are still in the state of war and the key aggressor is the Russian Federation.”
Id.
55. See Almost 1,000 Dead Since East Ukraine Truce—UN, BBC (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30126207.
56. Death Toll in Ukraine Conflict Exceeds 5,000, May be “Considerably higher”—UN, UN
NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsId
=49882#.VMmNPSxKpuV.
57. See Lucy Westcott, Ukraine Deaths Top 5,000 After Week of Violence, NEWSWEEK
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-deaths-top-5000-after-week-violence301675 (noting that the surge in violence between the Ukrainian government and
separatists was the most violent since the September 5 ceasefire).
58. See, e.g., Andrey Ostroukh, Gregory L. White & Julian E. Barnes, Doubt Clouds
Ukraine Truce, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2015, at A1.
59. Death Toll in Ukraine Conflict Exceeds 5,000, May be “Considerably higher”—UN, supra
note 56. This is a conservative number with deaths, injuries and displacement most likely
significantly higher than reported. See id.
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III. WHAT TYPE OF CONFLICT EXISTS IN UKRAINE?
The stealth occupation of Crimea, coupled with the Russian involvement
with the separatists, makes characterizing the Ukraine conflict extraordinarily difficult.60 To accurately classify the hostilities requires recognizing that
in both factual and legal terms the occupation and the civil war are separate
co-existing conflicts taking place within Ukraine.61
A. Applicable Law
Before addressing the specific circumstances of the armed violence in
Ukraine, it is helpful to briefly consider how conflicts are classified under
the law of armed conflict. Prior to 1949, the law of armed conflict or jus in
bello—somewhat self-evidently—applied during time of war.62 It was gener60. See, e.g., MacFarquhar, supra note 52 (“Kiev and the West have accused Moscow of
destabilizing the country, first with a stealth invasion and annexation of Crimea and then
by inspiring and covertly arming the rebels in southeastern Ukraine.”); Sohrab Ahmari, The
Weekend Interview: The View From NATO’s Russian Front, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 6,
2015) (quoting Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges, commander of United States Army
Europe, as calling the conflict in Ukraine “hybrid warfare”).
61. Parallel armed conflicts simultaneously taking place within a single State is not
novel; it has been recognized by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua. See
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
¶ 219 (June 27) (finding that both an international and non-international conflict were
simultaneously taking place in Nicaragua) [hereineafter Nicaragua]. See also James Summers,
Introduction, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF WAR: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 10 (Caroline Harvey, James Summers & Nigel D. White eds.,
2014) (noting that a simultaneous international and non-international armed conflict was
found to exist in Nicaragua as there were hostilities “between the Nicaraguan government
and the Contra rebels within the country and external intervention by the USA”). The
International Criminal Court (ICC) came to a similar conclusion in the Uganda case. See
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment, ¶¶
563–67 (Mar. 14, 2012). The ICC opinion is particularly relevant as it found “that, while
Uganda’s occupation of Bunia airport in the Democratic Republic of the Congo created
an international armed conflict, th[ere] existed along-side a separate non-international conflict involving rebel groups in the region.” Id.
62. See GEOFFREY S. CORN, VICTOR HANSEN, RICHARD B. JACKSON, CHRIS JENKS,
ERIC TALBOT JENSEN & JAMES A. SCHOETTLER JR., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN
OPERATIONAL APPROACH 67 (2012). As noted by the authors, the application of the law
of war was not a function of a positive rule. That is, treaties like the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions, as well as the 1929 Geneva Conventions, do not specifically define the
circumstances that trigger their application. Of course, the question then becomes what is
meant by war. Again, the authors note that war, for the purpose of international law, was
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ally agreed that this meant regularly declared international war with recognition on both sides that a state of war existed between the belligerent parties.63 The greater context, of course, was that international law was focused on the relationship between States and did not regulate matters within the domestic jurisdiction of States.64 Early law of armed conflict accords,
such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1929 Geneva
Conventions, did not define the specific circumstances triggering their application. Jean Pictet, in his Commentary to the First Geneva Convention,
highlighted the problem with the historical methodology:
[t]here have been too many cases where the contested legitimacy of the
enemy Government, or the temporary disappearances of sovereign States
as a result of annexation or capitulation, had been invoked as pretexts for
not observing one or other of the Conventions. The need for a remedy to
this state of affairs had become urgent.65

The remedy came in the form of Common Articles 2 and 3 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which trigger the application of the Conventions to
international and non-international armed conflicts, respectively.66 Common Article 2 provides that the Conventions shall apply to all cases of declared war, international armed conflict and partial or total occupation.67 In
defined by renown publicist Lassa Oppenheim as “a contention between two or more
States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and
imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.” Id. at 3 (citing 2 LASSA
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 202 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
63. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 28 (Jean
Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter GC I COMMENTARY].
64. See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 32, 33.
As noted by the author, civil wars were not real wars. Such conflicts could be regulated by
the law of armed conflict in the situation where there was a recognition either by the State
involved in the conflict or by a third-party State of the belligerency of the insurgent group.
See id.
65. See GC I COMMENTARY, supra note 63, at 28.
66. Common Articles 2 and 3 are today understood as establishing the trigger for the
application of treaty and customary international law related to their respective category of
armed conflict. See CORN, HANSEN, JACKSON, JENKS, JENSEN & SCHOETTLER, supra note
62, at 74.
67. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter GC I].
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a so-called Common Article 2 armed conflict, all four of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions apply.68 Accordingly, from 1949 onwards, the broader and
more flexible notion of international armed conflict69 replaced the concept
of “war” as a primary triggering mechanism for the law of armed conflict.70
Of particular note to the Ukraine conflict is the categorization of a total
or partial occupation of enemy territory as an international armed conflict
under Common Article 2.71 During international armed conflicts, belligerent parties often penetrate, and, if possible, take possession of enemy territory.72 These “occupations” are conceived of as a temporary state of affairs
existing until the parties to the conflict execute a peace accord.73 However,
an occupation does not have to be the result of actual fighting between the
parties to a conflict.74 History is replete with examples where an occupation
occurred as a result of a threat to use force by the occupying power against
68. Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, whose provisions
supplement the 1949 conventions, also applies for those States that have ratified it.
69. In terms of triggering an international armed conflict, the intensity and duration
of the fighting is not controlling in terms of the characterization of the armed conflict.
The application is triggered by two or more States using their armed forces against each
other. See International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict”
Defined in International Humaniatrian Law? 1 (Opinion Paper, 2008), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
70. 1 MARCO SASSÓLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?
108 (2d ed. 2006). The drafters obviously sought to break down the previous formalistic
barriers tied to a declaration or state of war and have the protections of the conventions
linked to the facts on the ground, with correspondingly broad based application.
71. See GC I, supra note 67, art. 2. Occupations and conflicts under Article 1(4) of
Additional Protocol I are regulated by the law governing international armed conflicts. AP
I, supra note 8, art. 1(4).
72. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION 1 (2009).
73. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, in DETENTION
AND OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 197 (Michael N. Schmitt &
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg eds., 2012).
74. As to the case of partial or total occupation, Common Article 2 states that an
occupation occurs even if it meets no armed resistance. The reference to a lack of armed
resistance was intended to cover situations similar to the German annexation of
Czechoslovakia prior to World War II. GC I, supra note 67, art. 2. See also DINSTEIN,
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 72, at 35; Occupation and International Humanitarian
Law: Questions and Answers, ICRC (Apr. 4, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resour
ces/documents/misc/634kfc.htm (“[F]or the applicability of the law of occupation, it
makes no difference whether an occupation has received Security Council approval, what
its aim is, or indeed whether it is called an ‘invasion,’ ‘liberation,’ administration’ or
‘occupation.’ . . . [It] is solely the facts on the ground that determines its application.”).
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the occupied country.75 “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”76 In an effective occupation, therefore, the occupied power is rendered incapable of exercising its governmental authority over the occupied
territory, and the occupying power substitutes its own authority for it. 77
Occupation law78 applies from the moment an occupying power effectively
controls all or part of their enemy’s territory.79 Most importantly, it is this
body of law that determines the rights and obligations of occupying and
occupied powers.80
For those armed conflicts “not of an international character occurring
in the territory of a state,” such as an internal civil war between a State and
a non-State armed group,81 the applicable law is described in Common Article 3. The application of the law of armed conflict to non-international
armed conflicts through the implementation of Common Article 3 marked
one of the important innovations in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Called

75. See, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3 (1993);
Akande, supra note 64, at 44.
76. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42, annexed
to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
77. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 213 (1959).
78. Occupation law is found in the law of armed conflict and particularly in Hague
Regulations, supra note 76, arts. 42–56; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 47–78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; AP I, supra note 8, arts. 63, 69, 72–92; and customary international law.
79. George Packer, Occupation, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0, at 307, 308 (Roy Gutman,
David Rieff & Anthony Dworkin eds., 2007).
80. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 270, 270 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
81. “Armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of the
High Contracting Parties” is defined as a non-international armed conflict. See, e.g., GC I,
supra note 67, art. 3. “Non-international armed conflict generally arises, as the ICTY
[International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] noted, ‘within a state,’
although the conflict need not unfold, at least entirely, within one state’s geographic
borders.” HELEN DUFFY, THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (2005). The Statute of the International Criminal Court
describes a non-international armed conflict as one that takes place in the territory of a
State when there is protracted armed conflict between government authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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a “convention in miniature,”82 Common Article 3, along with Additional
Protocol II,83 is the primary source of international law in an internal armed
conflict.84 The international law regulating an internal armed conflict, while
providing baseline humanitarian obligations, is far less developed than the
law regulating international armed conflicts.85 This is primarily due to the
internal nature of these conflicts and the continuing applicability of domestic law to the hostilities.
Determining when a non-international armed conflict exists versus a
mere “internal disturbance,” such as riots or “isolated and sporadic acts of
violence,” is often complicated and subjective.86 Similar to their intent with
regard to international armed conflicts, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions wanted the scope of application for non-international armed conflicts
to “be as wide as possible” to ensure “respect for certain rules” which are

82. See COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT
PRISONERS OF WAR 34 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter GC III COMMENTARY]
(“Article 3 is like a ‘Convention in miniature.’ It applies to non-international conflicts only,
and will be the only Article applicable to them until . . . a special agreement between the
Parties has brought into force between them all or part of the other provisions of the
Convention.”).
83. Additional Protocol II supplements “Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions,” but limits the applicability of the law to only those situations where
“dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” which are “under responsible
command” exercise “control over a part” a State. AP II, supra note 9, art. 1. These formal
conditions for applicability are in contrast to the vague and non-binding criteria set forth
in the commentaries to the Geneva Conventions. See infra note 88. They are the basis of
one of the objections the United States has to Additional Protocol II.
84. There are a number of other law of armed conflict treaties addressing noninternational armed conflict. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e);
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317.
Moreover, customary international law provides more robust regulation of noninternational armed conflict. See Akande, supra note 64, at 33.
85. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Present and Future Conceptions of the Status of Government Forces in
Non-International Armed Conflict, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 145, 148–49 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012)
(Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (stating “in purely
quantitative terms, the positive law of NIAC pales in comparison to the law-of-war
provisions applicable to conflicts between States”). This is true despite the overwhelming
majority of armed conflicts since 1945 being characterized as non-international. See
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2002).
86. See AP II, supra note 9, art. 1(2).
OF
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“essential in all civilized countries.”87 As a result, there are no universally
accepted conditions to objectively distinguish between an internal disturbance and a non-international armed conflict, though there are a number of
criteria that may indicate the difference between a domestic police action
and a civil war.88 In those situations where an armed disturbance does not
reach the level of a “conflict” domestic law applies and international humanitarian law is generally irrelevant.89
On the other end of the spectrum is the question of when an internal
armed conflict may become internationalized. As outlined in the Tadić
opinion,90 and later adopted by the ICC in its Lubanga decision,91 a noninternational armed conflict can ripen into an international armed conflict
if a State sufficiently controls guerillas participating in a civil war. The
amount of control a State must have over a rebel group to internationalize
a non-international armed conflict is a point of controversy in international
law.92 However, the Tadić opinion sets forth the “overall control” test for
determining when guerilla forces are sufficiently controlled by a State actor

87. See GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 36–37 (“No Government can object
to observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it
and them, a few essential rules . . . .”).
88. The commentaries to the Geneva Conventions give a list of non-binding criteria
that include: the non-State armed group is an organized military force, under responsible
command, with control of territory and respects the law of armed conflict, and the State
actor responds with its regular armed forces. See, e.g., GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82,
at 36. The Rome Statute of the ICC describes a non-international armed conflict as one
that takes place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between
government authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups. Rome
Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(f). Others have stated that the two primary criteria for
applicability are that the rebel forces must display a minimum level of organization and the
fighting must present a minimum of intensity. See, e.g., ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 78 (2008).
89. International Committee of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law?
(2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (stating “[i]nternational humanitarian law applies only to [international or non-international] armed conflict; it does not cover internal tensions or disturbances such as isolated acts of violence.
The law applies only once a conflict has begun, and then equally to all sides regardless of
who started the fighting.”).
90. Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 137.
91. Lubanga, supra note 61, ¶ 211 (adopting the “overall control” test asserted in the
Tadić opinion).
92. For a more in-depth analysis, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND
SELF-DEFENCE 221–24 (5th ed. 2011).
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to internationalize a civil war.93 Merely providing “assistance to rebels in
the form of the provision of weapons or logistical support” does not
necessarily create an international armed conflict.94 This gap allows a State
providing assistance to a rebel group “some elbow room before its action is
considered to be crossing” the threshold into an international armed
conflict.95
Classifying a conflict is a necessity for determining whether the law of
armed conflict is applicable and, if so, the scope of that application.96
Again, it is possible to have multiple types of conflicts taking place simultaneously within one State.97 So what is the appropriate conflict classification for Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the hostilities in eastern Ukraine?98
B. Occupation of Crimea
As discussed in the background section, in late February and early March
of 2014 Russian troops took control of the Crimean peninsula, located on
Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, in a bloodless, or near bloodless, military takeover. Russian Federation control of Crimea began when unidentifiable soldiers, colloquially called “little green men” by the local population, but later
confirmed to be members of the Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz),99
stormed the Crimean parliament.100 Simultaneous with this special opera93. Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 137.
94. Nicaragua, supra note 61, ¶ 195.
95. See Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks on Non-International Armed Conflicts, in
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note
85, at 399, 411.
96. See id.
97. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 54 (2012) (stating “the fact
that a particular class of conflict is taking place in one part of a country does not
presuppose that a similar class of conflict is taking place in another part”).
98. See Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, supra note 26 (discussing the ongoing
conflicts in Crimea and eastern Ukraine).
99. Shevchenko, supra note 1.
100. See Harriet Salem, Shaun Walker & Luke Harding, Crimean Parliament Seized by
Unknown Pro-Russian Gunmen, THE GUARDIAN (Feb 27, 2014), http://www.theguardia
n.com/world/2014/feb/27/crimean-parliament-seized-by-unknown-pro-russian-gunmen.
According to President Putin, the “little green men” were members of self-defense groups
organized by the locals who bought all their uniforms and hardware in commercial shops,
notwithstanding the fact that their guns were the same as those used by the Russian army,
their lorries had Russian number plates and they spoke in Russian accents. See
Shevchenko, supra note 1. Despite these claims it is well-established that the unknown
gunmen were part of the Russian special forces. See supra text accompanying note 44–45.
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tion, Russian regular armed forces blockaded Ukrainian military installations in order to facilitate their seizure of airports, government buildings,
ports and broadcasters.101 The mobilization of the Russian armed forces
within Crimea was relatively easy as stationing agreements executed between Russia and Ukraine allowed for a significant presence of Russian
Federation forces in the peninsula.102 Specifically, these agreements provided Russia with long-term leases for over one thousand naval facilities,103
two airfields and a training facility on the Crimean peninsula.104 Reports put
the Russian military presence in Crimea before the takeover at approximately 25,000 personnel, 22 airplanes, 24 artillery complexes, and 132 armored trucks.105
Within a week after the seizure of the parliament, senior U.S. administration officials estimated Russian ground and naval forces had complete
operational control over the entire Crimean peninsula.106 Russian possession of all key governmental locations and infrastructure supported this
assessment.107 Despite a few incidents, such as on March 8, 2014 when
warning shots were fired by Russian forces to prevent an OSCE unarmed
observer mission from entering the peninsula,108 Russian control of Crimea
occurred with minimal violence. The formal annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation on March 21, 2014 officially displaced the Ukrainian

101. See Ukraine: The End of the Beginning?, THE ECONOMIST (May 8, 2014), http://ww
w.economist.com/news/briefing/21598744-having-occupied-crimea-russia-stirring-up-tro
uble-eastern-ukraine-end.
102. See Russia Allowed to have 25,000 Troops in Crimea Since 1999... & Other Facts you
May Not Know, ECONOMICPOLICYJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.economic
policyjournal.com/2014/03/russia-allowed-to-have-25000-troops-in.html.
103. The most significant naval force in Crimea is the Russian Black Sea Fleet at the
port of Sevastopol. See Robert McMahon, Ukraine in Crisis, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Aug. 25, 2014).
104. See Anna Arutunyan, Russia’s Possible Undercover Military Intervention, USA TODAY
(Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/15/russias-pos
sible-undercover-military-intervention/6464433/.
105. Id.
106. See Elizabeth Landau, Diana Magnay & Ben Wedeman, In Russia’s “Low-key”
Invasion of Crimea, the Fight is Over Information, CNN (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.cnn.
com/2014/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-crimea/index.html.
107. See Uri Friedman, Putin’s Playbook: The Strategy Behind Russia’s Takeover of Crimea,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/20
14/03/putins-playbook-the-strategy-behind-russias-takeover-of-crimea/284154/.
108. See Baczynska, Polityuk & Kasolowsky, supra note 26.
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government as the sovereign power, while solidifying Russian control of
the peninsula.109
Given the above circumstances, even though the occupation was
“bloodless,” the fact that it was coercive and non-consensual marks it as a
belligerent occupation.110 Therefore, a partial belligerent occupation of the
Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation exists and has most certainly
implicated the Common Article 2 trigger.111 As “military occupation is a
matter of fact,”112 the Russian Federation has clearly displaced the Ukrainian government as the governmental authority in Crimea through a military
invasion.113 Russian attempts to evade responsibility are simply irrelevant.114
Occupation is triggered by “conditions on the ground that cannot be dismissed by politics or propaganda.”115 Thus the legal status of Crimea remains unaltered by the Russian annexation.116 Consequently, a Russian occupation of Crimea currently exists triggering all applicable international
law.117
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing the low threshold
required for the triggering of occupation law).
111. Arguably, one of the most important principles underlying the portion of the law
of armed conflict related to belligerent occupation is that the occupying power does not
acquire sovereign rights over the occupied territory. Rather, the occupying State exercises
only provisional and temporary powers through the administration of the occupied
territory.
112. Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 355 (1956).
113. See DINSTEIN, BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, supra note 72, at 38 (stating that an
occupation exists when “the contested area is solidly seized by the invader, and the
sovereign is actually displaced”).
114. See the Hostages Case. United States v. List (Case No. 7), 8 LRTWC 34 (Military
Tribunal V, 1948), in 11 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
under Control Council Law No. 10, at 757, 1243 (1951) (“Whether an invasion has
developed into an occupation is a question of fact. The term invasion implies a military
operation while an occupation indicates the exercise of governmental authority to the
exclusion of the established government.”).
115. Marc Warren, Belligerent Occupation, in U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE LAW
(Geoffrey S. Corn, Shane R. Reeves & Rachael Vanlandingham eds.) (forthcoming 2015).
116. On the issue of annexation and occupation of Crimea, see Robin Geiss, Russia’s
Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of International Law Grind Slowly but They Do Grind, 91
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 425 (2015).
117. The corpus of the positive law of belligerent occupation can be found in specific
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as supplemented by Additional Protocol I
and the Hague Declarations and Conventions of 1899 and 1907. See DANIEL THURER,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT 148–49
(2011).
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C. Civil War in Eastern Ukraine
The scuttling of the trade agreement with the EU by then-President Yanukovych in November 2013 started an upward spiral of violence in
Ukraine.118 By July 2014 the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) had characterized the violence in eastern Ukraine as a noninternational armed conflict.119 Although this determination is non-binding,
the ICRC’s statement is firmly grounded in the law of armed conflict. By
any criteria the violence in eastern Ukraine long ago passed the threshold
from internal disturbance to non-international armed conflict. The separatists are an organized armed group120 in control of significant territory
who are engaged in a protracted armed conflict with the Ukrainian military.121 The intensity of the violence has continually—and often dramatically—increased since the summer of 2014, with casualties mounting for both
the Ukrainian military forces and the separatists.122 Regardless of whether
the non-binding criteria found in the commentaries to the Geneva Conventions, or the more restrictive test established in international jurisprudence, is applied to the circumstances in eastern Ukraine, the existence of a
non-international armed conflict is indisputable.123
The more difficult conflict classification question is whether the relationship between the Russian Federation and the pro-Russian separatists
has internationalized the internal armed conflict. Determining that the
118. See Antonia Mortensen, Ukraine Protests: 5 Things you Need to Know, CNN (Feb. 19,
2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/13/business/ukraine-protests-explainer/. It is
believed that Russia threatened Ukraine with trade sanctions if it signed the deal with the
EU.
119. See Ukraine: ICRC Calls on All Sides to Respect International Humanitarian Law, ICRC
(July 23, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/0723-ukraine-kiev-call-respect-ihl-repatriate-bodies-malaysian-airlines.htm.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 233–35 (explaining why the separatists meet
the criteria to be an organized armed group).
121. See, e.g., Ostroukh, White & Barnes, supra note 58, at A1. In discussing the
February 15, 2015 peace agreement, the authors quote Alexander Zakharchenko, the head
of the separatists self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic. Id. The peace agreement
recognizes that the separatists are in control of significant territory in eastern Ukraine and
outlines the obligations of the Ukrainian military and the separatists. Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 54–59.
123. Compare GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 36, with Tadić, supra note 11, ¶
70, and Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(2)(f). See also supra text accompanying notes 87–
89 (discussing the various approaches to characterizing a non-international armed
conflict).
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Ukraine civil war qualifies as an international armed conflict is dependent
upon whether Russia sufficiently controls the separatists. In particular, the
question is whether they have overall control over the separatists.124
Russia is, undoubtedly, involved in the ongoing Ukraine civil war.
Though they consistently deny these accusations,125 there is overwhelming
evidence showing the Russians actively equipping, training and even
fighting alongside the separatists in eastern Ukraine.126 Yet it is difficult to
determine the full extent and scope of their control of the separatists, as
the Russian-backed rebels are seemingly independent actors.127 Without
more evidence to clarify the Russian-separatist relationship, it is not known
whether Russia is exercising a sufficiently high level of control over the
separatists to internationalize the well-established non-international armed
conflict.128 Given this challenge and because of the overwhelming evidence
supporting the existence of a non-international armed conflict, this article
considers the situation in eastern Ukraine to qualify as the latter. However,
as more advanced Russian weaponry and Russian soldiers pour over the
border, it is becoming more difficult to posit that the hostilities are truly
internal to Ukraine.129
124. Tadić, supra note 11, ¶ 137.
125. See Alan Cullison & Philip Shishkin, Ukrainians, Skeptical of Truce, Vow to Rearm,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 2015, at A6 (“Moscow denies sending troops or armor
into Ukraine.”).
126. See, e.g., Ahmari, supra note 60, (noting that the commander of United States
Army Europe has said that the separatists have advanced weaponry that only could come
from Russia); Cullison & Shishkin, supra note 125 (“In Kiev, a Ukrainian military
spokesman said that around 50 tanks, 40 missile systems and 40 armored vehicles crossed
into Ukraine.”). See also supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the number of
Russian soldiers fighting in the Ukrainian civil war).
127. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 46–50 (discussing the separatist action of
shooting down Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17).
128. But see Robert Heinsch, Conflict Classification in Ukraine: The Return of the “Proxy
War”?, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 323, 354–60 (2015) (“The ICTY’s jurisprudence
adopting the overall control standard has clarified the circumstances in which the
internationalization of a noninternational conflict may be found to have occurred. While
greater clarity of information would be desirable, it seems likely that the situation in
eastern Ukraine can be qualified as an internationalized non-international armed conflict,
i.e., an original non-international armed conflict, which, through the indirect influence of
Russia and the support it is providing to, and control it is exercising over, the pro-Russian
separatists, has become an international armed conflict.”).
129. See, e.g., Laura Smith-Spark & Nic Robertson, Is Peace Possible in Ukraine? Key
Leaders Meet to Find Out, CNN (Feb. 11, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/
02/11/europe/ukraine-conflict/ (accusing Russia of sending heavy weaponry and soldiers
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The occupation of Crimea and the non-international armed conflict in
eastern Ukraine, though inextricably linked, remain best viewed as parallel
international and non-international armed conflicts.
IV. STATUS CLASSIFICATION AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The conflict classification paradigm proposed above allows for battlefield
status determinations for those participating in the Ukraine hostilities.130 To
analyze the status of each of the primary participants in the Ukraine conflict, it is first important to understand how individuals are generally classified under the law of armed conflict.
It must be emphasized, as a preliminary matter, that questions concerning which State is responsible for the Ukraine hostilities have no effect on
the rights and obligations of those participating in the hostilities.131 Once a
State is in a “period of war, international armed conflict, or occupation”
responsibilities and protections become universal for participants132 and
“the politics of deciding who has breached that law [prohibiting the use of

into Ukraine). See also Michael R. Gordon, Armed With Google and YouTube, Analysts Gauge
Russia’s Presence in Ukraine, NEW YORK TIMES, May 27, 2015, at A6 (“An unusual
investigation using publicly available videos, smartphone photographs and satellite images
shows that Russia is continuing to defy the West by conducting protracted military
operations inside Ukraine . . . .”).
130. GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN WAR 149 (2010). The law of armed conflict provides a sophisticated regulatory
regime, in terms of both positive and customary law, that classifies individuals based upon
their group status and/or individual conduct during armed conflicts with significant
practical and policy consequences flowing from such determinations. See id.
131. It is important to maintain the bifurcation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In
an article in the International Review of the Red Cross, Kolb describes the difference between
these two areas of the law by stating, “[j]us ad bellum refers to the conditions under which
one may resort to war or to force in general; jus in bello governs the conduct of belligerents
during a war, and in a broader sense comprises the rights and obligations of neutral parties
as well.” Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus In Bello, 320
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 553, 553 n.1 (1997), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnuu.htm.
132. Brian J. Bill, Human Rights: Time for Greater Judge Advocate Understanding, THE ARMY
LAWYER 54, 58 (June 2010). For a more in-depth discussion of jus in bello, see Shane R.
Reeves & David Lai, A Broad Overview of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, in THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 142 (Lynne Zusman ed., 2014).
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force] should not have a bearing on the protection of war victims.”133 It is
the jus in bello, “predicated on the postulate of equal application of its legal
norms to all Parties to the conflict,”134 alone that regulates the conduct of
the participants.135 Violations or breaches of this specialized area of international law “cannot be justified on the ground that the enemy is responsible
for commencing the hostilities in flagrant breach of the jus ad bellum.”136
Jus in bello is built upon the “fundamental” and “intransgressible” principle of distinction.137 Additional Protocol I Article 48, which is reflective
of customary international law,138 provides:
[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives.139

The preamble to the highly influential St. Petersburg Declaration emphasizes that war is to be waged against the armed forces of the enemy and
not against the civilian population.140 Accordingly, in international armed
conflicts individuals are divided into two broad categories—combatants
and civilians—which are mutually exclusive and absolutely complementary.141 A third category, albeit not expressed in the law of armed conflict, is
that of “unlawful combatant,” which is “a short hand expression . . . de133. Andrew J. Carswell, Classifying the Conflict: A Soldier’s Dilemma, 91
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 143, 152 (2009), available at http://www.
icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-873-p143.htm.
134. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4 (2004).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 4–5.
137. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 78, 79 (July 8).
138. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 3–25 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL RULES].
139. AP I, supra note 8, art. 48.
140. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 7 (2d ed. 2004). See also St.
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Times of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/decpeter.asp.
141. Nils Melzer, The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 296 (Andrew
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014).
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scribing those who take up arms without being authorized to do so by international law.”142 Understanding the general parameters of these status
categorizations is a necessity in order to comply with the principle of distinction.143
A. Combatants
Combatants are those individuals who “have the right to participate directly in hostilities.” 144 This status, which only exists in an international
armed conflict, 145 applies to most members of the armed forces 146 and to
certain individuals who take an active part in hostilities regardless of their
membership in an armed force.147 More specifically, combatants include the
regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict;148 members of militia,
volunteer corps and organized resistance movements that are under responsible command, have a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly and conduct their operations in accordance
with the laws of war;149 members of a regular armed force who profess
142. SOLIS, supra note 130, at 208.
143. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1863 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski
& Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP I COMMENTARY].
144. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2).
145. CIHL RULES, supra note 138, r. 3.
146. Medical and religious personnel, though members of the armed forces, are
considered noncombatants. SOLIS, supra note 130, at 191–94.
147. Yoram Dinstein, Unlawful Combatancy, in 2 THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 227, 227 (Michael N. Schmitt & Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg eds., 2012).
148. “The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups, and units which are under a command responsible to that party for the
conduct of its subordinates.” CIHL RULES, supra note 138, r. 3. Additional Protocol I
words the definition in a slightly different manner. It states, in part, as follows: “Members
of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have
the right to participate directly in hostilities.” AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2).
149. See GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(2). See also BOOTHBY, supra note 97, at 142.
Members of other militias and volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, must belong to a party. GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(A)(2). They retain
combatant status whether they are operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided they fulfill the requisite conditions. Id. Further, their status
does not change whether they are assimilated into the armed forces of a party or act as a
distinct organization as long as they continue to comply with the outlined criteria.
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their allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the detaining power;150 and those inhabitants of a non-occupied territory that form a
levée en masse.151 Combatant status is only concerned with the legal right to
participate in a conflict and not actual conduct during hostilities. As a result, an individual deemed a combatant is a lawful target who is continuously a “legitimate object of attack . . . as long as they are capable of
fighting, willing to fight or resist capture.”152
If captured, a combatant is entitled to the “status of a prisoner of
war . . . subject to the conditio sine qua non that he is a lawful combatant.”153
As a prisoner of war, the individual enjoys assimilation rights154 and can
AP I Article 44(3) allows a belligerent to attain combatant status by carrying his arms
openly during each military engagement and when visible to an adversary while deploying
for an attack. The Additional Protocol standard “lowers the threshold for obtaining
combatant status . . . by eliminating the classic requirement for ‘having a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance’ . . . .” INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW
DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 17 (2013) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. The United States,
concerned that the elimination of this requirement undercuts the principle of distinction,
rejects AP I Article 44(3) as customary law, and maintains the traditional combatant
requirements outlined in the Geneva Conventions. See id.
150. This provision is a historic artifact from World War II when certain States
refused to recognized belligerent combatant units which professed allegiance to a
government or authority which these States did not recognize. See GC III COMMENTARY,
supra note 82, at 61. The distinguishing characteristic of this subset of combatant status is
that, in the view of their adversary, these individuals are no longer operating under the
direct authority of a party to a conflict. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW
OF ARMED CONFLICT 63 (2d ed. 2000).
151. A levée en masse exists when“[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms
openly and respect the laws and customs of war.” GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(A)(6). For a
more in-depth discussion of this unique combatant status category, see generally David
Wallace & Shane R. Reeves, The Law of Armed Conflict’s “Wicked” Problem: Levée en Masse
in Cyber Warfare, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 646 (2013), http://stock
ton.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=ils.
152. GREEN, supra note 150, at 124. See also SOLIS, supra note 130, at 188 (“[I]f a
combatant is home on leave and in uniform, far from the combat zone, and is somehow
targeted by an opposing combatant, she remains a legitimate target and may be killed—
just as the opposing combatant, if discovered outside the combat zone, may be killed by
his enemy.”).
153. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29; Melzer, supra note
141, at 305.
154. “POWs are assimilated, for protective purposes, into the armed forces of the
detaining state. As such, they are entitled to trial before the same courts, and according to
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assert combatant privilege from prosecution. This privilege, often called
“combatant immunity,” shields a prisoner of war from any “criminal responsibility for killing or injuring enemy military personnel or civilians taking an active part in hostilities, or for causing damage or destruction to
property,” provided their actions complied with the law of armed conflict.155 Captured combatants are therefore “not . . . regarded as criminals or
convicts . . . [but] are guarded as a measure of security and not of punishment.”156 If there is any doubt as to whether an individual, having committed belligerent acts and having fallen into the hands of an enemy is a combatant as defined by the categories above, his or her status would be determined by a competent tribunal.157
B. Civilians
The second broad status characterization expressly recognized by the law
of armed conflict is that of civilian. The term “civilian” is curiously left undefined in the positive law and, instead, is outlined under the law applicable
in international armed conflicts as “any person who does not belong to one
of the categories of person referred to in Article 4A(1), (2), (3) and (6) of
the Third Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol.”158 A civilian is, therefore, defined in the negative as it is any individual who is not
a member of the armed forces.159 The “protection of civilians is one of the
main goals” of the law of armed conflict,160 and if there is any doubt about

the same procedures as member of the regular armed forces of the detaining state.” Derek
Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1493, 1506
(2004).
155. Id.
156. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Rules of Land Warfare ¶ 60
(1914). It is “especially forbidden” to “declare that no quarter will be given,” to kill or
wound “treacherously” an adversary’s armed forces or those who have surrendered.
Hague Regulations, supra note 76, art. 23.
157. See GC III, supra note 8, art. 5. Article 5 raises a presumption that individuals
who might be prisoners of war shall have the Third Geneva Convention applied to them.
See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 228.
158. AP I, supra note 8, art. 50(1).
159. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 143, ¶ 1913.
160. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other
/icrc-002-0990.pdf [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
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the status of an individual the assumption is they are a civilian.161 Civilian
status is not absolute and is forfeited “for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”162 Thus, if a civilian chooses to take up arms “or participate[s] actively in hostilities,” they lose benefits associated with their protected status.163
Unlike combatant status, civilian status exists in non-international
armed conflicts as well as in international armed conflicts.164 However,
where the “protections and obligations of the law of international armed
conflict are premised almost entirely on the status of affected persons, the
law of non-international armed conflict spurns such classifications, as well
as the international armed conflict taxonomy of status-based protection.”165
As a result, there is a legal difference between those civilians who directly
participate in an internal armed conflict and those who do not. Some
scholars have attempted to address this difference by adopting the term
“fighters” to describe “both members of the regular armed forces fighting
on behalf of the government and members of armed groups fighting
against the government.”166 The term is “employed in lieu of ‘combatants’
in order to avoid any confusion with the meaning of the latter term in the
context of the international law of armed conflict,” but does not connote
lawfulness to participate in the hostilities.167

161. See AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 143, at 610.
162. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(3).
163. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29–30.
164. See AP II, supra note 9, art. 13(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded
by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”). However, a
civilian’s “activities alone cannot constitute a non-international armed conflict, for such a
conflict cannot exist without an organized armed group on at least one side. Thus, the
category of directly participating civilians only has meaning in the context of an ongoing
non-international armed conflict.” See Michael N. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters in
a Non-International Armed Conflict, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 85, at 119, 135.
165. Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 145, 146 (2012).
166. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY
¶ 1.1.2 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC MANUAL].
167. Id. As noted by the authors of the Manual, the term “fighter” does not appear in
any binding treaty.
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C. Unlawful Combatants
The term “unlawful combatant,” also sometimes referred to as “unlawful
belligerent,” is not a distinct individual battlefield status168 and does “not
appear in the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols, or any other
LOAC treaty, convention or protocol.”169 The term is instead descriptive
for those who unlawfully engage in combat activities by taking a part in
hostilities “without being entitled to do so.”170 Unlawful combatants may
include spies and saboteurs,171 mercenaries,172 members of a State armed
force who abuse their status,173 members of a non-State armed group174 or
civilians who “directly participate in hostilities.”175
168. See HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of
Israel, 62(1) PD 507 [2006] (Isr.), reprinted in 46 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373,
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/e16/02007690.e16.htm
(noting that according to the state of current international law there is no separate
category for unprivileged belligerents).
169. SOLIS, supra note 130, at 206–8 (quoting CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of
Israel, 62(4) PD 329 [2008] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/
06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.htm).
170. Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 45 (2003), available at https:/
/www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_849_dorman.pdf.
171. See Hague Regulations, supra note 76, arts. 29–31; AP I, supra note 8, art. 46.
172. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 47 (stating “a mercenary shall not have the right to be
a combatant or a prisoner of war”).
173. See DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29 (“[U]nder
customary international law, a sanction (deprivation of the privileges of a prisoner of war)
is imposed on any combatant masquerading as a civilian in order to mislead the enemy and
avoid detection.”). But see AP I, supra note 8, art. 44(4) (“A combatant who falls into the
power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements [to be a combatant] shall
forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections
equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war . . . .”).
174. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 32–34. Individuals who
are members of organized non-State armed groups become unlawful combatants due to
their “continuous combat function” within the group. “Membership must depend on
whether the continuous function assumed by an individual corresponds to that collectively
exercised by the group as a whole, namely conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State
party to the conflict.” Id. at 33. Members of non-State armed groups do not have the
privileges affiliated with combatant status. Id.
175. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(3). There is much debate concerning what constitutes
“a direct part in hostilities.” Compare ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at
5–6 (“The Interpretive Guidance provides a legal reading of the notion of ‘direct
participation in hostilities’ with a view to strengthening the implementation of the
principle of distinction.”), with Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups
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In international armed conflicts, being categorized as an “unlawful
combatant” results in a number of adverse consequences. Similar to a
combatant, an unlawful combatant remains a legitimate target regardless of
their location or activities.176 However, if captured, an unlawful combatant
is not afforded prisoner of war protections or any combatant privileges.177
Without immunity, the individual “may be prosecuted and punished to the
extent that their activities, their membership, or the harm caused by them is
penalized under national law,”178 even if “these acts do not constitute war
crimes under international law.”179 These harsh penalties are intended to
“simultaneously reward soldiers for being readily identifiable and deter civilians from entering the fray, thereby keeping the line between combatants
and civilians as discernible as possible and maximizing civilian safety.”180
In non-international armed conflicts, civilians who are “fighters”
against the sovereign government are equated to unlawful combatants. As
such, they are targetable for the entirety of their membership or their active
participation181 without any of the privileges of combatant status. Though
and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641, 641 (2010), and
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A
Critical Analysis, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 1, 5 (2010) (criticizing the
Interpretive Guidance recommendations). However, there is agreement that once a civilian
directly participates in hostilities, his civilian status and protections are suspended and
consequently “may be attacked in the same manner as identified members of an opposing
armed force.” HANDBOOK, supra note 149, at 20.
176. See INTERNATIONAL & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
DESKBOOK 134 (2010).
177. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942) (“Lawful combatants are subject to
capture and detention as prisoners of war,” while “[u]nlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment . . . .”).
178. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 84.
179. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 30 (citing ALLAN
ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 305 (1976) (explaining that
unlawful combatants “may be punished under the internal criminal legislation of the
adversary for having committed hostile acts in violation of its provisions (e.g. for murder),
even if these acts do not constitute war crimes under international law.”).
180. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 118 (2005).
181. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 132. In a noninternational armed conflict the same general rules related to targeting apply as in an
international armed conflict through the application of customary international law. See
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international law necessitates humane treatment and fair trials if they are
captured or are hors de combat,182 there remains a built-in distinction between
the government forces and those who fight against it. 183 “The latter are
viewed as traitors and, if captured, are liable to be prosecuted and punished
for violations of domestic law. They cannot be expected to be accorded the
privileges of prisoners of war status.”184 Civilians who are either a member
of a non-State armed group or directly participate against government forces in a non-international armed conflict therefore assume significant risk as
they have greatly diminished protections.
V. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE UKRAINE CONFLICT PARTICIPANTS?
As explained in Part III, the Ukraine conflict is both an occupation and a
non-international armed conflict. By applying the framework outlined in
Part IV to this conflict characterization, it is possible to determine the individual status of those participating in the conflict. These status determinations clarify the legal protections and obligations for each of the primary
actors and are discussed below.
A. Russian Regular Forces
On March 21, 2014 Russians celebrated as President Putin, in a nationally
televised event, signed legislation to “finalize” the annexation of Crimea.185
Despite these theatrics, the occupation of Crimea continues,186 thus the
entirety of the law of armed conflict is triggered,187 including certain rights
and obligations for members of the Russian armed forces.188 As Russian
Jelena Pejic, Conflict Classification and the Law Applicable to Detention and the Use of Force, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 102.
182. The overarching requirement of humane treatment, which now reflects
customary international law, is based upon Common Article 3(1) and Articles 2(1) and
4(1) of Additional Protocol II. See Pejic, supra note 181.
183. Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES148 (Wolff Heintschel
von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2010).
184. Id.
185. See Putin Signs Laws Completing Procedure to Absorb Crimea into Russia, REUTERS
(Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101488951.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 27–38, 103–6.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 111–17 (noting that a Russian occupation of
Crimea currently exists thus triggering all the law of armed conflict).
188. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2).
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soldiers are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, they
have “a right to participate directly in [the] hostilities” as combatants.189
This status applies to all members of the Russian regular armed forces in
Ukraine except those with protected status, such as medical and religious
personnel.190 This status imparts the legal right to participate and is unconcerned with conduct; therefore, Russian soldiers are combatants regardless
of their particular duties.191 Further, whether the Russian soldier is passively
involved in the occupation of Crimea or heavily engaged in combat operations to support the separatists in eastern Ukraine is irrelevant to their status as a combatant. As the Crimea occupation triggered an international
armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the rights and duties of combatant status apply to the conflict regardless of geographic location.192
As a combatant, the Russian regular soldier participating in the Ukraine
conflict has all the protections and obligations associated with that status.
This includes immunity from “criminal responsibility for killing or injuring” Ukrainian military personnel, civilians taking an active part in hostilities or for causing damage or destruction to property,” provided their actions comply with the law of armed conflict.193 Conversely, they may “immediately be targeted without any specific conduct” by Ukrainian forces,
assuming they have not surrendered, been captured or are otherwise hors de
combat.194 If Ukrainian forces do gain control over a member of the Russian
regular forces, that individual soldier must be treated as a prisoner of war if
189. Id. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 149, at 16 (“Combatants are military personnel
lawfully engaging in hostilities in an armed conflict on behalf of a party to the conflict. . . .
[They] are also privileged belligerents, i.e., authorized to use force against the enemy on
behalf of the State.” (emphasis in original)).
190. See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 191–94 (noting that medical and religious personnel,
though members of the armed forces, are considered noncombatants).
191. Reeves & Lai, supra note 132, at 145.
192. See supra section III(B) (portion on occupation of Crimea).
193. “[T]hey bear no criminal responsibility for killing or injuring enemy military
personnel or civilians taking an active part in hostilities, or for causing damage or
destruction to property, provided their acts comply with the LOAC.” HANDBOOK, supra
note 149, at 16. This privilege is often called “combatant immunity.”
194. See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 188 (“[I]f a combatant is home on leave and in
uniform, far from the combat zone, and is somehow targeted by an opposing combatant,
she remains a legitimate target and may be killed—just as the opposing combatant, if
discovered outside the combat zone, may be killed by his enemy.” (emphasis in original)).
See also GREEN, supra note 150, at 124 (stating that combatants are lawful targets who are
continuously a “legitimate object of attack, but only as long as they are capable of fighting,
willing to fight or resist capture”).
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he is operating in accordance with the obligations to attain combatant status.195
B. “Little Green Men”
The “little green men”—faces covered, wearing unmarked olive uniforms,
speaking Russian and using Russian weapons—have played a significant
role in both the occupation of Crimea and the civil war in eastern
Ukraine.196 While the Russian Federation initially denied any connection to
these armed actors, it is now widely accepted that the “little green men” are
Spetsnaz.197 These Spetsnaz commandos, practicing maskirovka or military
deception, use uniforms devoid of any insignia to make it difficult to attribute their actions to Russia.198 This unconventional method of warfare is
intended to cause confusion and disorientation among the Ukrainian government and its allies in hopes of slowing any defensive response.199 While
the tactic has been successful,200 it is questionable whether the unmarked
Septsnaz commandos operating in Ukraine are complying with the legal obligations required to receive combatant status.201
Similar to other members of the Russian military participating in the
Ukraine-Russia international armed conflict, Spetsnaz commandos are assumed to be combatants.202 Combatant status, however, is conditioned on
195. See supra text accompanying notes 153–56 (discussing combatant rights as a
prisoner of war).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28, (noting the role of the “little green
men” in both Crimea and eastern Ukraine.) See also Editorial, The Siege of Mariupol, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-siege-of-mariupol1422490152 (“More recent sightings of ‘little green men’ in insignia-less uniforms suggest
the presence of Russian special forces fighting alongside the rebels.”).
197. See, e.g., Lucy Ash, How Russia Outfoxes its Enemies, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Jan.
28, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283 (noting that Russian President
Vladimir Putin admitted to the use of Russian special forces in Crimea in an April 17,
2014 speech).
198. See id. The elements of “maskirovika” are surprise, camouflage, maneuvers
intended to deceive, concealment, the use of decoys and military dummies, and
disinformation. Id.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Russia’s Special Ops Invasion of Ukraine Has Begun, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 15,
2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/15/russian-commandos-invadeukraine.html (discussing the confusion caused by the Spetsnaz in Ukraine).
201. See supra section IV(A)(discussing the criteria for receiving combatant status).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 189–92.
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combatants distinguishing themselves from both the civilian population
and the opposing armed forces.203 Distinction, the “foundation on which
the codification of the laws and customs of war rests,”204 “ensure[s] respect
for and protection of the civilian population and objects”205 and is an inviolable requirement for maintaining combatant status.206 Embedded within
this requirement is an absolute obligation for the Spetsnaz commandos to
clearly delineate themselves from the Ukrainian military and the civilians
who unfortunately happen to live in the area of hostilities.207 This duty includes “not only physical separation of military forces and other military
objectives form civilian objects . . . but also other actions, such as wearing
uniforms.”208 Choosing to ignore this obligation by “masquerading as a civilian in order to mislead the enemy and avoid detection” may lead the
Spetsnaz commandos to lose the privileges associated with combatant status.209
Yet wearing a uniform with a Russian insignia is not an absolute requirement for the commandos to comply with the principle of distinction.210 The law of armed conflict mandates only that belligerents be distin203. See GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 52.
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those of the Hague Convention, considered
that it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of armed forces should have
for purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each State to take steps so that members of
its armed forces can be immediately recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily
distinguishable from members of the enemy armed forces or from civilians. The
Convention does not provide for any reciprocal notification of uniforms or insignia, but
merely assumes that such items will be well known and that there can be no room for
doubt.

Id.

204. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 143, at 598.
205. AP I, supra note 8, art. 48.
206. See DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29.
207. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 118 (2005).
208. W. Hays Parks, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493, 514 (2003).
209. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 29 (noting that under
customary international law deprivation of the privileges of a prisoner of war are imposed
to those combatants that fail to comply with the principle of distinction).
210. See Matthew R. Grant & Todd C. Huntley, Legal Issues in Special Operations, in U.S.
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 115. The authors argue that distinction
comes in many forms, “including those forms which would obtain prisoner of war status
for militias and organized resistance groups [which] belong to a belligerent state.” See also
Parks, supra note 208, at 516–17 (noting that although the wearing of uniforms is the
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guishable; it does not require that they advertise their nationality.211 According to law of armed conflict expert Hays Parks:
The law of war regards a uniform as the principal way in which conventional military forces distinguish themselves from the civilian population
in international armed conflict. State practice (including US practice),
treaty negotiation history, and the views of recognized law of war experts
reveal (a) that the law of war obligation is one of distinction that otherwise has eluded precise statement in all circumstances; (b) there is no
agreed definition of uniform; (c) the uniform “requirement” is less stringent with respect to Special Forces working with indigenous forces or executing a mission of strategic importance; and (d) a law of war violation
occurs only where an act is perfidious, that is, done with an intent to deceive, and the act is the proximate cause of killing, wounding, or capture
of the enemy.212

Spetsnaz commandos, carrying Russian manufactured arms openly,
wearing unmarked-Russian type uniforms and speaking Russian, are clearly
not impersonating the Ukrainian military nor are they attempting to blend
into the civilian population.213 Their conduct, a regular tactic for a special
operations force, is not perfidious as they remain distinguishable members
of the Russian military.214 Their singular act of using unmarked uniforms
does not constitute a violation of the principle of distinction; therefore, the
“little green men” maintain the privileges associated with their status as
combatants in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

typical means by which combatants distinguish themselves from the civilian population, it
is not the only means).
211. AP I, supra note 8, art. 44(3)(a)(b) (providing that a combatant retains his status if
he carries his arms openly during each military engagement and “during such time as he is
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the
launching of an attack in which he is to participate”).
212. Parks, supra note 208, at 541.
213. See Pifer, supra note 28 (noting that the “little green men” carried Russian
weapons, wore Russian uniforms and were clearly professional soldiers).
214. See Grant & Huntley, supra note 210, at 38–39 (discussing the regularity and
legality of non-regular uniform use by Special Force units).
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C. Ukraine Military Forces
Simultaneously engaged in an international armed conflict with Russia 215
and a non-international armed conflict with separatist forces,216 Ukrainian
military members have a different legal status that depends on whom they
are fighting.217 The international armed conflict triggered by the occupation
of Crimea makes the Ukrainian military members, similar to their Russian
counterparts, combatants.218 The full panoply of rights and duties associated with combatant status are thus conferred on the Ukrainian forces engaged with Russian forces.219 The status of these same Ukrainian military
members engaged with separatists in eastern Ukraine is more complicated.
Combatant status does not exist in a non-international armed conflict,220
and the term “fighter,” commonly used to refer to both members of the
State and non-State armed group, does not legitimatize participation in the
hostilities.221 In fact, the current law regulating non-international armed
conflict is silent with respect to the status of government forces in these
internal wars.222
This silence allows the Ukrainian government “to be free from international regulation” concerning the status or nature of the actors they employ
against the separatists.223 As Ukraine is engaged in an internal threat to its
sovereignty, its military members are essentially participating in a domestic
215. See supra text accompanying notes 110–17 (explaining the existence of the
international armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 118–23 (discussing the non-international
armed conflict currently taking place in eastern Ukraine).
217. See Summers, supra note 61, at 10 (noting that the co-existence of an international
and non-international armed conflict in the same geographic region is possible).
218. AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2). Again, medical and religious personnel in the
Ukrainian military are noncombatants. See SOLIS, supra note 130, at 191–94.
219. See AP I, supra note 8, art. 43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a Party to a
conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in
hostilities.”).
220. CIHL RULES, supra note 138, r. 3 (noting that combatant status only exists in
international armed conflicts). See also supra text accompanying notes 164–67 (discussing
the irrelevance of status in a non-international armed conflict).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 164–67, 181–84 (explaining who “fighter”
refers to in a non-international armed conflict and the reasons for adopting the term).
222. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 148–49 (“The NIAC
status void is even more pronounced with respect to the status of government actors in
NIAC.”)
223. Id.
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law enforcement operation.224 Ukrainian military members, in the context
of the non-international armed conflict taking place in eastern Ukraine,
therefore do not have a legal status as defined by international law.225 It is
domestic law, not the status taxonomy used in an international armed conflict that allows Ukrainian military members the legal right to participate in
the civil war.226 This absence of a combatant status, however, does not absolve Ukrainian military members from certain international legal obligations. They remain accountable in international tribunals for their conduct
in the hostilities227 and bound by numerous treaties for the means and
methods used against the separatists.228 Yet international law is limited to
regulating the behavior of Ukrainian forces, with the legality of their participation remaining within the purview of the government of Ukraine.229

224. Id.
225. Id. Professor Watts states:
Although States have created rules regulating the conduct of their forces in
NIAC, no positive international rules limit the nature of persons or
organizations governments may employ in NIAC. Nor does the law of NIAC
provide any general status for such forces. In fact, government forces’ status in
NIAC generally can be said to constitute one of the remaining voids of the
international laws of war.

Id.
226. Id. at 149. Some argue for a distinction-derived rule that limits direct
participation in hostilities in a NIAC to armed forces or militia that, in practicality, results
in a combatant-civilian status paradigm. See EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF
COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 68 (2010).
Professor Watts persuasively argues against this idea for logical, structural and practical
reasons. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 160–64.
227. Id. See also NIAC MANUAL, supra note 166, at 1 (“This Manual is a guide for
behaviour in action during non-international armed conflict.”); Rome Statute, supra note
81, art. 8(2)(c)–(f) (expressing jurisdiction over the conduct of NIAC).
228. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in 19 INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL MATERIALS 1523 (expanded to cover certain weapons use in a non-international
armed conflict).
229. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 149–53 (explaining
reasons why government forces’ status in a non-international armed conflict remains a
void in the laws of war).
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D. Separatists
The separatists, similar to the Ukrainian military members, are “fighters” in
the civil war. Despite this commonality, the separatists are not the legal
equal of the Ukrainian military members. Obviously their participation in
the conflict is not condoned by the Ukrainian government, leaving them
exposed to prosecution for “any acts that violate domestic law, even if they
are not violations of the law of armed conflict.”230 This includes being
prosecuted as a domestic criminal for attacking members of the Ukrainian
military. Additionally, if captured, the separatists are not entitled to the robust protections provided to a prisoner of war in an international armed
conflict, but rather they may be treated as criminals “subject to the domestic penal regime” of Ukraine.231 Their conduct, appearance and claims to
sovereignty are simply irrelevant and will not afford them immunity for
their actions. Again, it is domestic law that is the relevant “legal source for
both treatment obligations and immunities if any arising from participation
in a non-international armed conflict.”232
Perhaps more immediately consequential to the separatists is their exposure to being targeted by Ukrainian military forces. The separatists—
well-armed with Russian weapons, structured in named groups, such as the
United Armed Forces of Novorossiya,233 and executing coordinated mili230. Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 121.
231. See Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 148 (“[O]pposition
fighters captured in NIAC, no matter their appearance or conduct, are likely to be regarded as mere criminals, fully subject to the domestic penal regime of the territorial State.”);
Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 77–78 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau
eds., 2007) (“This coexistence can highlight the sharp legal differences in the two conflicts
so that captured soldiers from an intervening state could be entitled to prisoner of war
status, but captured rebels would not.”); NIAC MANUAL, supra note 166, ¶ 3.7 (discussing
due process obligations applicable to domestic prosecutions for behavior in a NIAC).
Interestingly, despite possessing the prerogative to prosecute the separatists as domestic
criminals, Russian media sources have reported that the Ukrainian military has conducted
“prisoner of war” exchanges with the militia members. See, e.g., Prisoner Swap between Donetsk Militias and Ukrainian Troops to be Resumed Soon, TASS (Oct. 16, 2014), http://
tass.ru/en/world/754832.
232. Watts, Present and Future Conceptions, supra note 85, at 149. International law does
afford the separatists the basic protections outlined in Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II. See generally supra text accompanying note 182.
233. “Novorossiya” is a historic concept that refers to the Russian speaking portion
of southeast Ukraine. Vladimir Putin used this reference to note that these regions were
not part of Ukraine during the tsarist period inferring that this provides a justification for
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tary operations234—constitute an organized armed group.235 As members of
an organized armed group in a non-international armed conflict, the separatists are “treated as analogous to members of the armed forces, and
thereby remain targetable even when not participating” in hostilities.236
While there is some controversy surrounding the question of when an individual is a member of an organized armed group versus a civilian directly
participating in hostilities,237 the actions of the separatists in eastern
Ukraine make this more a theoretical question than a practical concern.
Wearing uniforms, openly carrying arms, organized into units and employing military tactics, the separatists have most of the characteristics of a regular armed force, making them easily distinguishable from the civilian population.238 As a result, it is clear that the separatists are “attackable at any
time during the period of their membership.”239
This analysis of the separatists’ legal status is dependent upon the noninternational armed conflict not evolving into an international armed conflict. It is again important to highlight that “if the forces of another State
intervene on behalf of the opposition, an international armed conflict enmilitary action. See Adam Taylor, “Novorossiya,” the Latest Historical Concept to Worry about in
Ukraine, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiya-the-latest-historical-concept-toget-worried-about-in-ukraine/.
234. See, e.g., Mauldin, supra note 47.
235. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 128–31. Professor
Schmitt notes that “not all groups in a battlespace are ‘organized armed groups.’” Id. at
128. For the group to meet the criteria of “organized” the group must exhibit a degree of
structure and must act in a coordinated fashion. Id. at 129–30. To be “armed” the group
must have “the capacity to carry out ‘attacks,’ defined in LOAC as ‘acts of violence against
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.’” Id. at 131 (citing AP I, supra note 8, art.
49).
236. Id. at 127.
237. Compare ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 160, at 33 (adopting the
notion that an individual is a member of the organized armed group when they have
“continuous function for the group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities”),
with Watkin, supra note 175, at 641, and Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance, supra
note 175, at 5 (criticizing the Interpretive Guidance recommendations). This is not an
insignificant debate as an individual deemed a civilian is only targetable while they are
directly participating in hostilities. See AP II, supra note 9, art. 13.
238. See Andrew Roth, A Separatist Militia in Ukraine With Russian Fighters Holds a Key,
NEW YORK TIMES (June 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/world/eur
ope/in-ukraine-separatist-militia-with-russian-fighters-holds-a-key.html (describing the
Voskok Battalion which is the largest separatist militia in Donetsk).
239. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 132.
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sues between the State and the State against whom the pre-existing rebellion is under way; the conflict has been internationalized.”240 While it is currently unknown whether Russia is exercising a sufficiently high level of
control over the separatists, if the conflict is internationalized, and if the
separatists satisfy all the requisite criteria,241 they will become combatants
similar to the members of other participating armed forces. This, of course,
would be of significant consequence as the separatists would gain prisoner
of war status and combatant immunity.
E. Ukraine Nationalist Militias
So-called Ukrainian self-defense militias have recently formed in response
to what they view as the “ineffectiveness of the Ukraine Armed Forces in
the face of pro-Moscow separatists and Russian troops in the country’s
southeast.”242 These militias are not equipped or funded by the Ukrainian
government,243 have an independent command structure244 and exist mostly
on an ad hoc basis.245 While the Ukrainian government has not called for
these groups to disband, and is seemingly appreciative of their efforts, 246
the affiliation between the government forces and the self-defense militias
is based only upon their common concern to preserve a unified Ukraine.
While these self-defense militias are volunteer groups, it is clear they are
not controlled by the Ukrainian government and are better viewed as independent actors in the Ukraine conflict.
240. Id. at 121.
241. See supra text accompanying note 149 (outlining criteria for a militia members to
be given combatant status).
242. Jamie Dettmer, Ukraine Militias Warn of Anti-Kiev Coup, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 28,
2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/11/28/ukraine-militias-threaten-antikiev-coup.html.
243. See Jacob Resneck, Pro-Ukraine Militias are Forming to Counter the pro-Russia
Separatists, PRI (May 2, 2014), http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-05-02/pro-ukraine-militi
as-are-forming-counter-pro-russia-separatists.
244. See id. (discussing preliminary plans to set up a parallel command and control
structure for the militias).
245. See, e.g., Andrew Roth, Ukraine Faces Struggle to Gain Control of Militias, Including
Those on its Side, NEW YORK TIMES (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/05/24/world/europe/ukraine-faces-struggle-to-gain-control-of-militias-includingthose-on-its-side.html?_r=0.
246. See Dettmer, supra note 242 (quoting Ukrainian national security spokesman,
Andriy Lysenko, as stating in reference to the militias “they provide their own assistance
and we are grateful to them for this”).
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As an unaffiliated volunteer group participating in the Ukraine civil
war, the self-defense militias do not seem to “belong” to a party to the conflict as required by the law of armed conflict,247 and are similar to other peripheral actors on the battlefield, including individually armed civilians and
criminal groups. It can be argued that these self-defense militias, who have
a common interest with the Ukrainian government in fighting Russia, are
adequately connected to the Ukrainian military through their shared ideology. This argument, however, is unpersuasive as the Ukrainian government
does not support these groups and has no oversight of their activities. The
self-defense militias fighting in Ukraine, not belonging to the Ukrainian
military, are therefore not combatants, but rather civilians choosing to take
part in the hostilities.248
VI. CONCLUSION
The occupation of Crimea and the civil war in eastern Ukraine, though inextricably linked, remain best viewed as parallel armed conflicts. This conflict classification paradigm allows for battlefield status determinations for
those participating in the hostilities and helps to distinguish between those
actively engaged in the Ukraine conflict and the civilians living through the
war. The law of armed conflict “is predicated on a subtle equilibrium between two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian considerations.”249 The balance between these countervailing concepts “permeates throughout the entirety of the law ensuring that force is
applied on the battlefield in a manner that allows for the accomplishment
of the mission while simultaneously taking appropriate humanitarian considerations into account.”250 Clarifying the legal status of the various actors
on the Ukrainian battlefields helps to maintain this delicate balance and
reinforces the law of armed conflict as an effective regulatory regime.
247. See GC III, supra note 8, art. 4(A)(2) (“Members of other militias and members of
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict . . . .”).
248. See Schmitt, The Status of Opposition Fighters, supra note 164, at 122. On a practical
note, it is unlikely these groups would be prosecuted for their actions as they are fighting
on behalf of the Ukrainian government. See supra text accompanying notes 223–29.
249. DINSTEIN, CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 134, at 16.
250. Shane R. Reeves & Jeffrey S. Thurhner, Are We Reaching a Tipping Point? How
Contemporary Challenges Are Affecting the Military Necessity-Humanity Balance, HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL (June 24, 2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06 /HNSJ-Necessity-Humanity-Balance_PDF-format1.pdf.
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